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"Like all natural resources today, water is subject to never-
ending debate over social, economic, and environmental goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although all natural resources are highly valued in our society, water is a
special resource that engenders both hostile regionalism on one hand, and on the
other hand, a sense of community in which everyone should be entitled to enjoy
its bounty.2 It is the confluence of these views of water that makes water resource
management one of the most essential and challenging issues facing states in the
western United States.3 Although many of the western river basins are fully
allocated, continued population growth in the region has caused the demand for
water to increase.4
State and local governments have decided that the optimal way to meet the
increased demand for water is through the use of water transfers.5 These transfers
serve as a way to reallocate the water supply to accommodate the increasingly
competitive demand for water.6 San Diego, California, in an effort to deal with its
limited supply of water and rapidly expanding population, attempted to negotiate
a water transfer from the Imperial Valley.7
Unfortunately, transferring water is not a problem-free panacea that solves all
of the West's water allocation problems.8  Water transfers are complex
transactions that raise numerous issues and problems.9 For example, the problem
of third party effects, or externalities, is present in virtually every water transfer.'
The State Water Resource Control Board (SWRCB) is the governmental agency
in California charged with evaluating the third party effects of proposed transfers
and deciding whether or not to permit transfers of water rights acquired after
1. DEP'T OF WATER RES. POLICIES AND GOALS FOR CALIFORNIA WATER MANAGEMENT: THE NEXT 20
YEARS, at iii (1982).
2. See George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 474 (1989) (noting that,
as a unique resource, water forces policy makers to balance desires to protect slower developing, water-rich
regions, with the competing interest of allowing all geographic regions to enjoy the benefits of water).
3. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2. A water transfer is "a change in the point of diversion, place of use, nature of use, or time of
use of a water right." Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the
West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 684 (1987).
6. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the proposed transfer).
8. See infra Part IV.A (describing the impact of the transfer on the community selling its water).
9. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that third party effects are present
when water is transferred).
10. See, e.g., id (noting that "[a]ny transfer can have significant third party effects..
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1914." The San Diego County Water Association (SDCWA) and the Imperial
Irrigation District (ID) must first gain approval from the SWRCB before their
agreements can take effect.'2 Among other things, the SWRCB is the
administrative agency with the primary responsibility of regulating and
determining water rights. 3 The SWRCB authorizes appropriation of water and
establishes the terms and conditions of its use. 4 When deciding which transfers
to allow, the SWRCB considers three factors:
(1) prevention of injury to other legal users of water;
(2) avoidance of unreasonable effects on fish and wildlife; and
(3) if water is moved by the [State Water Project] or other state,
regional, or local public agency, actions needed to avoid the
unreasonable effects on the overall economy in the county
from which the water is transferred.'
This comment focuses on the third factor.
The socio-economic impacts of the transfers are among the third party effects
that the SWRCB takes into consideration. 6 When San Diego and the Imperial
Valley were negotiating their transfer, they sought approval from the SWRCB. 7
When the SWRCB evaluated the transfer, it examined the socio-economic
impacts of the transfer on residents of the Imperial Valley.8
The primary focus of this comment is to discuss whether the SWRCB has,
and should have, the authority to consider the socio-economic impacts of
proposed long-term transfers. Part II of this comment briefly explores the history
of water needs in California. This background information provides the context
necessary to understand the problems facing California communities and the
rationale behind California water law. Part III discusses general water law rules
and provisions that apply to voluntary transfers of water, focusing primarily on
11. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1980) (observing that,
"[s]ince 1914... exclusive jurisdiction over the granting and administration of appropriative rights has been
delegated to the board...").
12. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1735-37 (West 1988 & Supp. 2003); see generally STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD., ORDER WRO 2002-0013 (Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013]
(discussing at length the criteria on which the SWRCB bases its decision to permit or deny the transfer from the
liD to the SDCWA).
13. SCOTT S. SLATER, 1 CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY § 1.13 (1995) (noting that the SWRCB
is also charged with the duty of enforcing the reasonable use requirement of the California Constitution and
administering water quality regulation). See also CAL. WATER CODE § 179 (West 1971) (defining the
SWRCB's powers and duties).
14. See People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865-66 (Cal. 1980) (discussing the role of the board and the
authority vested in it).
15. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, WATER TRANSFER ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 6 (2002).
16. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 76-77.
17. See generally SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12.
18. Id. at 76-80.
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the California Water Code as it pertains to the SWRCB's power to regulate
transfers of water. Part IV focuses on the proposed water transfer from the IID to
the SDCWA, primarily focusing on whether the SWRCB has the authority to
consider the socio-economic impact to non-rights holders. Part V considers the
policies of water transfers and attempts to determine whether the SWRCB should
have the power to take socio-economic issues into consideration. In making this
determination, it is necessary to examine the institutional competence of the
SWRCB, as well as the social and economic issues related to water transfers.
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WATER IN CALIFORNIA
A. Origins of the Present Problem
Problems arising from water transfers are not new in California. 9 Growth in
parts of Southern California initially depended upon the "use of local water
supplies.. ..""0 As Southern California continued to grow, groundwater levels
declined throughout the costal areas.2' Seawater then began to fill and
contaminate the ground water basins.22 With the depletion of local water supplies
and continued growth, many areas had to look to outside sources for water.23
Many areas are now dependent upon water from the Colorado River.24
B. The Present Need for Imported Water in California
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) projects that by
2020, California's water shortage will be 2.4 million acre-feet (maf)25 in average
19. See, e.g., HAROLD E. ROGERS & ALAN H. NICHOLS, I WATER FOR CALIFORNIA: PLANNING, LAW &
PRACTICE, FINANCE §§ 90-98 (1967) (discussing the early settlement of the Pacific Southwest, including
California, as it pertains to water sources and water rights).
20. Id. at § 91.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In 1906, Los Angeles won approval of a water transfer agreement and became one of the first
cities in California to use water transfers as a means of obtaining needed water from outside souraes. Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, L.A. Aqueduct: A Hundred or a Thousand Fold More Important, athttp://
www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp000560.jsp (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). The Owens Valley/Los Angeles water transfer was the first major agricultural to urban water
transfer in California. See WILLIAM L. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER 436-39 (1982) (stating that the Owens
Valley/Los Angeles transfer was considerably more important and more influential than other water transfers in
California). Although the Owens Valley/Los Angeles water transfer won approval almost 100 years ago, it
remains a controversial issue today. See generally id. (discussing the Owens Valley/Los Angeles transfer in
depth). In fact, the devastating effects of this transfer on the Owens Valley provided the impetus for California
to enact laws restricting water transfers. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 115.
24. ROGERS & NICHOLS, supra note 19, at §§ 91-92.
25. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, A HISTORY 2 (Univ.
of Cal. Press 2001) (stating that an acre-foot is the amount of water that will cover one acre of land one foot in
depth. This is approximately 326,000 gallons and is approximately as much water as two urban families use in
one year.).
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years and 6.2 maf in drought years. 26 This projected shortage represents an
increase from estimated shortages of "1.6 maf in average water years, and 5.1
maf in drought years" at a 1995 level of development.27 The projection for an
increased shortage is mainly due to increased demand fueled by population
growth. California's population is expected to increase by more than fifteen
million people between 1995 and 2020.29
Approximately thirty percent of the water California uses for urban and
agricultural purposes is supplied by groundwater in non-drought years, with
groundwater providing an even larger percentage in drought years.3° At one point
California had an estimated 1.3 billion acre-feet of groundwater, but as a result of
overpumping, now has only 850 maf.' Additionally, current estimates indicate
that less than half of this remaining groundwater is usable because of "quality
considerations and the cost of withdrawal."32 Given the significant role that
groundwater plays in California's water supply, the sizeable decrease in the
quantity of useable groundwater, and the projected increase in water demand, it is
easy to see that California needs to find other sources of water.3
The shortage of water is especially acute in Southern California. San Diego
County currently relies on the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD) for all of its imported water,35 which accounts for 95% of San Diego's
water demand.36 The San Diego region, with a $92 billion economy37 and an
26. Dept. of Water Res., California Water Plan Update, BULLETIN 160-98 ES1-2 [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN] (forecasting the shortages and defining a shortage as the difference between water
supplies and water demands).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at ESI-2 to ESI-3 (noting that as of 1998, one in eight U.S. residents lived in California; and the
projected increase in population is equivalent to adding the 1998 populations of Arizona, Nevada, Oregon,
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah to California).
30. Id. at 3-48.
31. HUNDLEY, supra note 25, at 8-9.
32. Id.
33. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at 3-48 to 3-53 (discussing California's groundwater
supplies); see also id. at ES 1-2 (outlining the projected increase in demand for water in California).
34. See id. at 3-2 (stating that, although "[m]ore than 70% of California's... annual runoff occurs in
[Northern California,]... [a]bout 75% of the State's urban and agricultural [water] demands are south of
Sacramento"). The current water shortages experienced in Southern California are a function of allocation of
usable water. Cf 2002 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, ANN. REP. 4 (stating, "If all the water on the
earth were divided equally among all the people on the earth, each person would have enough [water] to fill
(ninety-four] Olympic-sized swimming pools"); cf id. at 12 (stating that only 1% of the earth's water is suitable
for humanity's needs).
35. San Diego County Water Authority, Water Transfer and Exchange Agreements at http://www.
sdcwa.org/manage/mwd-water transfer.phtml#benefits (last visited Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Water Transfer
and Exchange Agreements] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
36. Id. (noting that the proposed transfer from IID to SDCWA would give SDCWA a more reliable
source of water than it currently has with its junior priority rights from MWD); SDCWA became a member of
the MWD in 1946. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, San Diego County Water Authority, at
http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh20/pages/memberag/agencies/sandiego.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (copy
on file with the McGeorge Law Review). It is currently one of twenty-six members. Metropolitan Water District
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anticipated forty to sixty percent population growth by 2020,38 needs water to
ensure its continued prosperity.39 The SDCWA currently consumes 659,172 acre-
feet per year."0 San Diego County was also one of the regions most affected by
the California drought that lasted from 1987 to 1992.4' Because of San Diego
County's heavy dependence upon imported water and its susceptibility to water
shortages, the SDCWA and the liD entered into voluntary agreements whereby
SDCWA would have purchased liD's surplus water.42 This transfer would have
been "the largest agriculture-to-urban water transfer in United States history."43
The 1ID planned to make water available for transfer by implementing
conservation measures, thereby making the conserved water available for
transfer."
The proposed IID/SDCWA transfer is not only an important part of San
Diego's water plan, but is also an essential part of California's requirement to
reduce its use of water from the Colorado River.45 California's basic annual
of Southern California, MWD Member Agencies, at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2o/pages/memberag/
member 02.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). As a junior
member, the SDCWA receives water from the MWD only after the demands of the more senior members are
met. See id
37. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreement4 supra note 35.
38. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at 4-5 (referring to growth from 1995 to 2020).
39. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreement4 supra note 35.
40. 2002 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. 53 (Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 2002).
41. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreements supra note 35. Floods and droughts dictate substantially
California's water supply and California frequently alternates from one extreme to the other making water
development uncertain. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at 3-6 through 3-7 (discussing droughts
and floods in California).
42. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreement.s supra note 35. This transfer would be extremely
beneficial to San Diego because it not only makes an additional 200,000 acre-feet available to the SDCWA, but
it also increases the reliability of San Diego's Water supply, since the lID is one of the most senior
appropriators of water from the Colorado River with pre-1914 rights. Imperial Irrigation District, Questions and
Answers, at http://www.iid.com/water/qa.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); see also Petitioner Imperial Irrigation District's Closing Brief in Support of Further Findings
Under the SWRCB's Retained Jurisdiction Pursuant to Decision 1600 and Order 88-20, and in Support of
Findings and Approval of Change Petition and Long-Term Transfer of Conserved Water at 32-34 (July 11,
2002) [hereinafter lID Closing Brief] (discussing the liD's water rights and the benefits the SDCWA would
enjoy under the proposed transfer).
43. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreements supra note 35. As of 1995, agricultural use accounted for
43% (33.8 mar) of the water demand in California while urban use accounted for 11% (8.8 maf) and
environmental use accounted for 46% (36.9 mat). CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ESI-2. By
2020, it is estimated that agricultural use will account for 39% (31.5 mat) of California's water demand while
urban use will account for 15% (12.0 mat) and environmental use will account for 46% (37.0 mat). Id.
44. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreements supra note 35.
45. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 2. In 1931, California and other states entered
into the Seven-Party Priority Agreement whereby California was apportioned 4.4 maf. Petitioner San Diego
County Water Authority's Closing Brief at 11-12 (July 11, 2002) [hereinafter SDCWA's Closing Brief]. In
addition to its 4.4 maf apportionment, the Secretary of the Interior can declare a surplus of water in the
Colorado River and permit states such as California to use the surplus water. Aizona v. California, 376 U.S.
340, 342 (1964).
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apportionment of water from the Colorado River is 4.4 maf.41 California is also
entitled to fifty percent of the surplus flows from the river.47 California has
historically consumed more than its allotment of Colorado River water, and, as of
1998, California was consuming 5.3 maf per year from the Colorado River.
48
California was traditionally able to exceed its apportionment because Arizona
and Nevada did not use their entire apportionments.4 9 California can no longer
divert Arizona's and Nevada's share of water from the Colorado River since
these states are now starting to use almost all of their apportionments."
California has developed a two-phase plan to reduce its use of water from the
Colorado River." This plan is known as the "Colorado River Board 4.4 Plan."52
The first phase of the plan is expected to continue until 2010 or 2015, while the
second phase is projected to possibly "extend beyond the ... planning horizon.
5 3
The goal of the first phase is to reduce California's consumption of Colorado
River water to approximately 4.6 to 4.7 maf per year through the use of already-
identified conservation methods and transfers 4 The goal of the second phase is
to further reduce California's consumption of Colorado River water to the basic
apportionment of 4.4 maf per year through the use of yet to be determined water
transfers.55
The IID/SDCWA transfer is intended to play a major role in the first phase of
California's Colorado River Board 4.4 Plan. 6 If the IID transferred the maximum
amount of transferable water permitted under the agreement, California could
reduce its use of Colorado River water by 200,000 acre-feet per annum (afa) 7
This reduction of 200,000 afa represents enough water to meet the demands of
400,000 urban families, 8 approximately 29% of the water reduction goal for
phase one of the Colorado River Board 4.4 Plan. 9
46. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ES2-8.
47. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 342.
48. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ES2-8.
49. Id.
50. Id. The completion of the Central Arizona Project coupled with the enactment of legislation that
allows groundwater banking in Arizona account for some of Arizona's increased consumption. Id. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-2401(G)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for the establishment of an Arizona water
bank that can store Arizona's unused apportionment of Colorado river water).
51. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ES2-8 to ES2-9.
52. Id. at ES2-8.
53. Id. at ES2-9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (mentioning the IID/SDCWA transfer as one of the identified transfers to reduce
consumption); see also SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 2 (noting the importance of the
IlD/SDCWA transfer).
57. See infra Part lV.A (discussing the terms of the IID/SDCWA transfer).
58. See HUNDLEY, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that one afa is enough water to satisfy the yearly demand
of two urban families of four).
59. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ES2-8 to ES2-9 (stating that California consumes
5.3 maf annually and is attempting to reduce its consumption to between 4.6 and 4.7 mat). The projected goal is
a conservation of.7 maf, or 700,000 afa, of which 200,000 would represent 29%.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO WATER LAW60
A. General Laws Pertaining to Water in California
"The riparian doctrine accords to the owner of land contiguous to a
watercourse a right to the use of the water on such land."61 Use of the water is
limited to use on the contiguous land.6" The water can be used for any beneficial
purpose, but the use "must be reasonable in relation to the reasonable requirements
of all other owners of lands riparian to the same source of supply.
63
The prior appropriation doctrine, on the other hand, is remarkably different
from the riparian doctrine. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, rights to use
water are acquired "by diverting water and applying it to reasonable beneficial use
for a beneficial purpose."'
While the prior appropriation doctrine is the basis of western water law,
California has retained, for streams, significant portions of the riparian doctrine as
well as prior appropriation. 6 Although these two doctrines exist simultaneously in
California, they are often in conflict with each other and the California court
system has spent a great deal of time adjusting these doctrines to eliminate the
conflicts.
6
Prior to 1914, California had limited state legislation regulating water rights.67
When California was admitted into the Union and became a state, the state
legislature "passed an act adopting the common law of England, so far as not
repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the
constitution or laws of the State...."" Without constitutional direction, the
California Supreme Court filled the vacuum left by the legislature and the state
60. This section provides only a brief background to provide the reader with some context of the
applicable laws. See generally William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and
Water Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957 (1988) (outlining the development and current state of water law in
California); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3 (providing an overview of water transfers in the West);
Jennifer L. Cordua, Comment, The Search for New Supplies: Salvaging the Remains of Agricultural Water
Conservation in CaliJbrniq 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 591 (1998) (discussing the legal background of transfers of
conserved agricultural water in California).
61. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 40 (1956).
62. Id.
63. Id. In other words, the riparian must put the water to use and must not use so much water that his use
diminishes the flow of the water such that it interferes with use of the water by other riparians. See generally id.;
see also SWRCB Meeting Workshop-Division of Water Rights Item 9 A.4.2 (July 5, 2000) (acknowledging that
determining whether a "use of water is reasonable and beneficial is complex").
64. HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 40. For more on the appropriation doctrine and definitions of these
terms, see generally id. at 40-51.
65. Grant, supra note 5, at 682-83 & n.13.
66. HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 40; see also United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1986) (discussing the application of the riparian and appropriation doctrines in California).
67. 62 CAL. JUR. 3d Water § 25 (1981). Cf HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 89 (noting that California
enacted Civil Code sections 1410 through 1422 in 1872 which set forth the procedures for appropriating water).
68. HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 52 (citing 1850 Cal. Stat. Ch. 95).
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constitution." In 1886, the California Supreme Court held, in Lux v. Haggin, that
when the California Legislature adopted the common law of England, it adopted
the riparian doctrine of water rights.7 ° While Lux is not the first case to state that the
riparian doctrine is the common law for California, it is, nonetheless, considered
the "cornerstone" of the riparian doctrine in California.7 '
B. Law Relating to Water Transfers
The term "transfer" in water law means "a change in the point of diversion,
place of use, nature of use, or time of use of a water right. 72 Traditionally, the law
has not viewed water as a marketable, transferable resource.73 This traditional view
of water is based in large part on water being essential for human survival and
having numerous values (such as recreational and aesthetic) that are difficult to
quantify.74
By the mid-i 970s it was becoming apparent to the state government that water
transfers could help alleviate some of the water shortage problems in California.75
In 1976, the Governor's Commission on Water Rights acknowledged the
importance of water transfers and recommended changes to the California Water
Code to pave the way for such transfers.76 The recommendations from the 1976
report brought about numerous changes to California water law.77
In order to help facilitate the recommendations of the 1976 Governor's
Commission on Water Rights, California Water Code sections 1725 through 1729
were enacted to govern short-term transfers, 7 and sections 1735 through 1738 were
enacted to govern long-term transfers.7 9 In addition to these laws governing short-
and long-term transfers, California Water Code section 1011 allows water rights
69. See 62 CAL. JUR. 3d Water § 25 (noting that the California Supreme Court was responsible for
developing state water law).
70. HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 52 (commenting on Lux v. Hagin, 10 P. 674, 749, 751 (1886)).
71. Id. (noting that the Lux opinion consumes over 200 pages in the California reports and is considered
a "treatise" on the water law of California and several other nations).
72. Grant, supra note 5, at 684 n.19.
73. CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, STAFF PAPER
No. 5: THE TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1977) (tracing the origins of water law to Roman
law where ownership of water rights was likened to ownership of wild animals); but see HUTCHINS, supra note
61, at 120-21 (stating that appropriative water rights have traditionally been seen as alienable property rights).
74. LEE, supra note 73, at 1.
75. See WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing the 1976 Governor's
Commission on Water Rights Report and its recommendations).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-29 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in
California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 273-76 (1994).
79. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1735-38 (West 1993) (Section 1738 was repealed in 1988.); Gray, supra note
78, at 273-76.
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holders to transfer water that they have conserved without having to worry about
forfeiture of their rights.8"
For the purposes of the transfer between the IID and the SDCWA, the most
pertinent sections of the California Water Code are sections 1727 and 1736.
Section 1727 governs the SWRCB's review of short term transfers and states in
part:
(b) The [SWRCB] shall approve a temporary change if it determines that
a preponderance of the evidence shows both of the following:
(1) The proposed temporary change would not injure any legal user
of the water ... through significant changes in water quantity, water
quality, timing of diversion or use, consumptive use of the water, or
reduction in return flows.
(2) The proposed temporary change would not unreasonably affect
fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses.8'
At the same time, section 173682 governing the SWRCB's approval of long-
term transfers states: "The [SWRCB] ... may approve such a petition for a long-
term transfer where the change would not result in substantial injury to any legal
user of water and would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream
beneficial uses."83 A cursory glance at these two statutes reveals that the statute
governing temporary transfers is more detailed than that governing long-term
transfers. While section 1727 sets the burden of proof at a preponderance of the
evidence, section 1736 is silent as to what burden of proof must be met before a
transfer will be permitted."
California Water Code section 1701 is another important provision for the
IID/SDCWA transfer and provides that water right holders may engage in water
transfers, but may only do so after receiving permission from the SWRCB. 85
Additionally, California Water Code section 1704 empowers the SWRCB to
approve with conditions, or deny a petition.86 Also, California Water Code section
80. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West 1999); Gray, supra note 78, at 273-76.
81. CAL. WATER CODE § 1727(b) (West 1999).
82. SB 479 would amend California Water Code section 1736 to add that the SWRCB "may approve a
petition for a long-term transfer ifthe change would not result in substantial injury to any legal user of water,
would not cause substantial negative thirdparty impacts, and would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or
other instream beneficial uses." SB 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but not enacted).
83. CAL. WATER CODE § 1736 (West 1991).
84. Id. §§ 1727(b), 1736 (West 1999).
85. Id. § 1701 (West 1957).
86. Id. § 1704(a) (West 2001). Although the SWRCB is usually required to provide a hearing prior to
approving or denying a petition, a hearing is not required if the petition is unprotested. Id. § 1704(c)(1).
Additionally, the SWRCB is not required to hold a hearing prior to approving or denying a petition if it
"determines that the petition is defective, the petition fails to provide information requested by the board, or
undisputed facts support the denial [or approval] of the petition and there is no disputed issue of material fact."
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1706 states: "The person entitled to the use of water by virtue of an appropriation
other than under the Water Commission Act or [the California Water Code] may
change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use if others are not
injured by such change.... ,87
C. The SWRCB's Power to Review and Regulate
In 1928, the California Constitution was amended.88 This amendment
"compresse[d] into a single paragraph a reconciliation and modification of
doctrines involved in litigation that vexed the judiciary of the state for a
century. ,. 9 The California Supreme Court stated that the amendment's goal
was to prevent the waste of water resources.90 When the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the amendment, the Court found a similar purpose and stated that
the amendment's goal was to advance the general welfare of California by
limiting waste and maintaining both the doctrine of riparian rights and the
doctrine of appropriation.9' This constitutional amendment, however, did not end
the discussion and debate over water rights in California."
California Water Code section 1051 states that the SWRCB is empowered to
"(a) [i]nvestigate all streams ... lakes, or other bodies of water[,] (b) [t]ake
testimony in regard to the rights to water or upon use of water ... [,] (c)
[a]scertain whether or not water heretofore filed upon or attempted to be
appropriated is appropriated under the laws of [California]."93 The SWRCB also
has the authority to protect the public interest through the issuance and
administration of permits and licenses for water use. 4 This broad authority allows
the SWRCB to control and condition the use of water.95
Parties claiming water from a pre-1914 appropriative right to surface water
are not required to seek approval by the SWRCB.96 However, parties transferring
water from a post-1914 appropriative right must seek approval from the
Id. § 1709(c)(2)-(3).
87. Id. § 1706 (West 1943).
88. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
89. 62 CAL. JUR. 3d Water § 28 (1981).
90. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal. 1933).
91. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 751 (1950).
92. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 61 (discussing California water rights).
93. CAL. WATERCODE§ 1051 (West 1991).
94. 62 CAL. JUR. 3d Water § 307 (1981).
95. Id.
96. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1700 code commission notes (West 1943) (stating that "an appropriation
prior to the act is neither required nor permitted to proceed under the act to obtain permission to change the
purpose of use but may change it without such permission and also without whatever protection such
permission might afford him"). The commission arrived at this conclusion because the 1925 amendment to
section 39 of the Water Commission Act "clearly restricts the section to water appropriated under the act."Id.
The end result, therefore, is that transfers of water appropriated prior to 1914 are not subject to review by the
SWRCB. Id.
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SWRCB.9 7 In determining whether it should approve a proposed long-term
transfer, the SWRCB makes two inquiries: (1) will the transfer "result in
substantial injury to any legal user of water"; and (2) will the transfer
"unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses. ' , 98
Commentators have noted that, although parties that did not have a legally
recognized interest in the water to be transferred traditionally had no standing to
object to the transfer, the SWRCB usually views the public interest as an
important consideration.99
IV. THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF WATER FROM THE IID TO THE
SDCWA: DID THE SWRCB HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE
THE TRANSFER AND CONSIDER THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS?
A. The Terms of the IID/SDCWA Agreement'°
In 1885, the California Development Company began appropriating water
from the Colorado River for use in the Imperial Valley.' ' The California
Development Company and its water rights were subsequently acquired by the
Southern Pacific Company.0 °2 The lID was established in 1911 and, in 1916, "the
Southern Pacific Company conveyed all of its water rights to the lID."'' 3
Although the lID had pre-1914 appropriative water rights to seven million afa
which it was in the process of perfecting,"'O the lID applied for eight permits to
appropriate water under the California Water Commission Act. ,0
97. Id. § 1700. Water Code section 1735 states, "The board may consider a petition for a long-term
transfer of water or water rights involving a change of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. A
long-term transfer shall be for any period in excess of one year." Id. § 1735 (West 1988).
98. Id. § 1736 (West 1991).
99. SLATER, supra note 13, § 10.02(4)(a); CAL. WATER CODE § 1736; see, e.g., SWRCB ORDER WRO
2002-0013, supra note 12, at 76-80 (discussing the socio-economic impact of the IID/SDCWA transfer).
100. The agreements between the lID and the SDCWA were highly complex and intricate. I do not
purport to provide a complete understanding of the terms of the agreements. I merely present, in an elementary
fashion, some of the most important terms in the agreements so as to provide some context for the reader. See
SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12 (providing a more thorough account of the agreements
between the two parties).
101. Imperial Irrigation District, The liD's Water Rights, at http://www.iid.com/water/petition/petition3.




104. A "perfected right" is:
a water right acquired in accordance with state law, which right has been exercised by the
actual diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a defined area of land
or to definite municipal or industrial works, and in addition shall include water rights created
by the reservation of mainstream water for the use of federal establishments under federal law
whether or not the water has been applied to beneficial use. ...
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 341 (1964).
105. The liD's Water Rights, supra note 101. The lID applied for these permits between 1933 and 1936
in response to the Seven-Party Agreement of August 18, 1931. Id. In filing for the permits, the IID was able to
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On January 6, 1950, the SWRCB issued Water Right Permit 7643 to the
ID."° This right "is a collective right shared with other agricultural water
users."' 10 7 The IID has seven permits for water rights, but the only rights at issue
in the proposed transfer are those stemming from Permit 7643.08 Permit 7643
was issued by the SWRCB on January 6, 1950 and permits the IID "to divert a
maximum of 10,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the Colorado River... for
irrigation and domestic use .... "' 09
On April 29, 1998, the IlID and the SDCWA signed a water conservation and
transfer agreement. " This agreement provided for Imperial Valley farmers to
implement conservation measures and transfer the conserved water to the
SDCWA." ' The initial term of the agreement would have been forty-five years
from the effective date."2 Under the terms of the agreement, both parties had the
unilateral right to renew for an additional thirty-year term."3 Additionally, "[t]he
agreement provide[d] cross 'rights of first refusal' [to both parties] ... for a
period of ten years after the end of the renewal period."'1 4 The agreement called
for a transfer of 20,000 afa in the first year."5 The quantity would have increased
by 20,000 afa, for each of the next ten years or until the maximum transferable
amount was reached.' 6 Rather than predetermining a specific amount of water to
be transferred each year, the agreement set 200,000 afa as the maximum
transferable amount and 130,000 afa as a minimum requirement. 
1 7
Given the amount of water that was proposed to be transferred, the Imperial
Valley would have had to enact numerous methods of conservation to meet the
minimum requirement under the agreement.' One method that would have to be
incorporate the apportionment and priority provisions of the Seven-Party Agreement while maintaining its
rights as a pre-1914 appropriator. Id.
106. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 3. This permit
authorizes lID to divert a maximum of 10,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the Colorado
River from January 1st to December 31st of each year for irrigation and domestic use on
992,548 acres of land. The permit limits lID's total annual diversion from the Colorado River
under all its water rights and its federal contract to 3,850,000 ... afa.
Id.
107. id. The right is shared as specified in the Seven-Party Agreement of August 18, 1931.
108. Id. at 4 & n.1.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Water Transfer and Exchange Agreements, supra note 35.
Ill. Id.
112. Imperial Irrigation District, Water Transfer Agreemen4 at http://www.iid.com/water/transfer.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Water Transfer Agreement] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
113. Id.
114. Id. According to this provision, if, within ten years of the end of the renewal period, the lID wants
to transfer water to any party other than the SDCWA, the SDCWA must first be offered the water. Conversely,





118. Id.; see also Imperial Irrigation District, Environmental Considerations, at http://www.iid.com/
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implemented is the controversial fallowing of fields."9 The main socio-economic
concern relative to the IID/SDCWA transfer was the loss of jobs resulting from
fallowing farmland. 20 The SWRCB concluded that farmland would have to be
fallowed in order to mitigate the effects the transfer would have on fish, wildlife
and other in-stream beneficial uses.121
The SWRCB concluded that fallowing land would result in annual losses to
Imperial County residents of five million dollars per year during the first six
years.' 2  The SWRCB estimated that these annual losses could be as high as thirty
million dollars per year if the entire 300,000 afa allowable under the terms of the
transfer were conserved by fallowing.'2' These economic losses would result from
"losses to the personal income of employees and business owners in Imperial
County.' 2' The SWRCB estimated that if the entire 300,000 afa were conserved
water/petition/petition8.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Environmental Considerations] (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that proposed on-farm conservation methods include: "(1) pump
back systems; (2) improved water management techniques (irrigation scheduling, water measurement, soil
monitoring); and/or (3) revised irrigation methods such as drip, sprinkler, and land leveling/land reshaping."
Additionally, proposed conveyance system conservation methods include: "(1) construction of additional
interceptors to collect operation spills from lateral canals; (2) reservoirs to match demand flows to delivery
flows; and/or (3) seepage collectors to collect canal leakage/seepage and return it (pump back) to the same
canal."). Id.
119. See Harold 0. Carter & Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Third-Party Effects: The Research Challenge, in
SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS & LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 41, 50 (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994)
(stating that fallowing generally requires farmers to idle farmland and not produce any crops, but occasionally,
fallowing permits farmers to produce rain-fed crops that do not require irrigation); see also SWRCB ORDER
WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 75-77 (stating that it would be necessary to fallow some land in lID in order
to conserve water to transfer and to mitigate the environmental impacts on the Salton Sea); Metropolitan Water
District of Southem California, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2o/pages/
news/faq.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003) [hereinafter MWD Frequently Asked Questions] (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the lID would have to fallow land to limit the environmental impact on
the Salton Sea and suggesting the proposed transfer was not approved by the lID by the December 31, 2002
deadline because of the economic effects of fallowing land). "The Salton Sea is the largest lake located entirely
within California," and has a volume of 7.5 maf. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 26, at ES2-19. The sea
is dependent upon inflow to avoid evaporation and it receives over I maf annually of inflow. Id. The majority of
this inflow is from agricultural drainage. Id. The Salton Sea has high levels of salinity. Id. at ES2-20. The level
of salinity increases as inflow decreases. See id. at ES2-19 to ES2-20. Increased salinity would have a negative
impact on the wildlife that inhabits the Salton Sea. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 35-38
(discussing the important role the Salton Sea plays in the environment). Since fallowing land results in a loss of
only one acre-foot of inflow to the Salton Sea for every three acre-feet of water transferred, while on-farm
conservation methods result in a one acre-foot loss of inflow for every one acre-foot transferred, fallowing will
be used to mitigate the environmental impacts of the transfer. See id. at 30 (describing the effects of
conservation); see also id. at 64-73 (discussing impacts of the transfer and ways to mitigate these impacts).
120. See generally SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 76-80 (discussing the socio-
economic effects of the proposed transfer).
121. ld. at 2-3.
122. Id. at 77-78. This does not mean that the LID does not have anything to gain by completing the
water transfer. By implementing the necessary conservation measures, the lID stands to benefit from: (1)
improved water efficiency by reducing the risk of flooding caused by excessive inflows into the Salton Sea; (2)
increased economic activity associated with constructing, maintaining, and operating efficiency projects; and
(3) reduced potential for disputes with junior rights holders seeking additional supplies, lID Closing Brief,
supra note 42, at 34.
123. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77-78.
124. Id.
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through fallowing, 1,400 jobs would be lost, but 700 jobs would be created from
the transfer if fallowing was not used.'25 The SWRCB also estimated that
fallowing land could reduce property tax and sales tax revenues, thereby
negatively impacting the local government.
2 6
It is important to note that these estimated economic impacts are just that,
estimates.127 The SDCWA claims that the SWRCB analysis of the possible socio-
economic impacts focused on the "worst-case scenario" and based its
assumptions on studies of fallowing in geographic locations dissimilar to the
lID.' 2' The SWRCB admits that the estimates are based on numerous assumptions
that might not come to fruition and would drastically alter the impact the transfer
would have on Imperial County.129 The liD estimated that if Imperial County
residents only fallowed land used to produce alfalfa, the loss of personal income
would be approximately $6.7 million for 300,000 afa.130 This is between one-
fourth and one-fifth of what the personal income loss would be if a mixture of the
crops that have historically been farmed in the lID were fallowed, when
compared with the fallowing of high value crops."'
The SWRCB further estimates that, although fallowing land will have a
negative impact on certain areas of the economy, fallowing will help ameliorate
other economic impacts of the transfer.'32 Fallowing land will help preserve
sportfishing and other recreational activities at the Salton Sea.3 3 Therefore, the
possible effects on recreation represent yet another factor to be considered when
assessing the socio-economic impacts of the transfer."'
125. Id. at 78.
126. Id.
127. See State Water Project Analysis Office, Water Transfers in California: Translating Concept into
Reality, at http://www.swpao.water.ca.gov/watertran.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Translating
Concept into Reality] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Reviei) (discussing the fact that evaluating the
costs associated with fallowing land presents numerous problems). It is difficult to determine how much land
would be fallowed regardless of the transfer due to federal acreage allotments, federal set-asides, weed control
and normal crop rotation. Id.
128. See SDCWA's Closing Brief, supra note 45, at 93-97 (arguing that the negative socio-economic
impacts of the transfer would be reduced or eliminated if the conservation program included: (1) temporary
fallowing rather than permanent fallowing; (2) targeting specific low value crops; (3) rotating specified
properties in and out of the conservation program; (4) maximizing payments to farmers rather than landowners;
and (5) targeting specific less productive soils to bear the brunt of the fallowing). The SDCWA contends that
these factors would make the lID conservation program more analogous to the purportedly successful Palo
Verde Test Land Fallowing Program. Id. at 94-96. The Palo Verde Test Land Fallowing Program yielded such
minimal negative socio-economic impacts that the Metropolitan Water District and the Palo Verde Irrigation
District are considering a long-term transfer program using water conserved by fallowing land. Id. at 94-95.
129. See SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 78-79 (providing alternate estimates if
Imperial residents fallowed less productive land that was used for less profitable crops).
130. Id. at 78.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 78-79.
133. Id. (stating that fallowing land could prevent $790 million in losses from decreased recreation over
an eleven year period).
134. Id.
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The SWRCB's examination of the socio-economic impacts of the proposed
transfer leaves open numerous questions. It is clear that the SWRCB's analysis is
based upon a multitude of estimates and assumptions.'35 What is less clear,
however, is what criteria the SWRCB uses when it decides to approve the
transfer.'36 Not only does the SWRCB fail to state what standard of review is used
to determine whether the socio-economic impacts are sufficiently minimal to
approve the transfer, but it does not even define the term "socio-economic
impact."'3
B. SWRCB's Authority to Consider Socio-Economic Effects of the Transfer
It is often stated that the SWRCB has the authority to consider socio-
economic impacts'38 when determining whether a water transfer is in the public
interest. The authors of these statements often refrain from citing direct authority
for this proposition.' 39
Under existing law, water users without a direct legal interest in the water
have no legally recognized claim to the water.'4 0 Neither the courts nor the state
legislature has recognized such a claim. 4 ' Once it has been determined that a
legal user is affected by a water transfer, the "no injury" rule must be
considered.14 The general rule is that a transfer cannot injure any legal user.
43
This general no injury rule does not, however, apply to long-term transfers such
as the proposed IID/SWCWA transfer.1' Long-term transfers must meet only the
lesser requirement that they do not cause "substantial injury" to any legal user.'
45
This "no substantial injury" inquiry cannot justify the SWRCB's analysis of
135. See id. at 77-80 (discussing the possible effects of the transfer).
136. See id. at 76-80 (commenting on the possible effects of the transfer, but failing to articulate
standards to determine what is an acceptable level of economic impact).
137. See id. The SWRCB merely uses the term "socio-economic impact" and discusses "economic
impacts" and whether the transfer is in "the public interest." See infra note 151 for a definition of socio-
economic impacts.
138. See SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77-78 n.19 (asserting that the SWRCB has
such authority).
139. See id. (asserting that the SWRCB has such authority while making statutory construction
arguments to support this assertion); see also SLATER, supra note 13, § 10.02(b) (suggesting that there is no
legislative or case law authority for this proposition).
140. SLATER, supra note 13, § 10.02.
141. Id.
142. See generally WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at app. 3 (outlining the no-injury
rule as it pertains to water transfers).
143. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1435(b)(2) (West 1996) (applying the no-injury rule to temporary urgent
transfers); id. § 1725 (applying the no-injury rule to temporary transfers); id. § 1706 (applying the no-injury rule
to transfers other than those under the Water Commission Act).
144. See WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at app. 3 (outlining the no-injury rule as it
pertains to water transfers). This report also provides applications of the statutes and examples of what
constitutes injury.
145. CAL. WATERCODE § 1736 (West 1991).
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socio-economic impacts because such an analysis considers impacts on people
who are not legal users of the water. 46 The "no substantial injury" rule, however,
only permits inquiry into injuries to other legal users.141
Not only is the no injury rule an unpersuasive argument for granting SWRCB
the authority to examine the socio-economic impacts of long-term transfers, but
the public-trust doctrine is unpersuasive as well. ' The California Supreme Court
articulated the public-trust doctrine in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court.4 9 While the common law public-trust doctrine affords the state the power
to hold, for the benefit of the people, an absolute right to all navigable waters and
the soils under them, it only applies to environmental issues.'5°
When the SWRCB examined the socio-economic impacts"' of the proposed
IID/SDCWA transfer, the SWRCB relied on California Water Code sections
1727 and 1736 for their authority.'52 Although the SWRCB conceded that
"section 1736 does not expressly provide for an evaluation whether a long-term
[transfer] will be in the public interest,"'53 the SWRCB, nonetheless, contended
that it has the authority to consider the socio-economic impacts of a long-term
transfer because section 1727 uses mandatory language requiring the SWRCB to
approve short-term transfers,' 4 while section 1736 uses permissive language
about approving long-term transfers.'55 According to the SWRCB, "the language
of the Water Code does not require, and sound public policy does not support, a
146. See SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77-78 (conducting such an analysis and
considering parties who are not legal users).
147. CAL. WATER CODE § 1736 (West 1991); see SDCWA's Closing Brief, supra note 45, at 89 (stating
that no SWRCB decision prior to SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013 or common law opinion has ever
interpreted the "no-injury rule" to permit the SWRCB to condition transfers on socio-economic considerations).
148. See Gould, supra note 2, at 474 (noting the reason for the differing treatment of environmental
effects as opposed to socio-economic effects is because "protection of the environment is now a well
established governmental function... [and] environmental values are not well represented in the marketplace
149. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
150. See id. at 718-20 (describing the public trust doctrine in California); see also Gould, supra note 2,
at 474 (discussing National Audubon Society.
151. Although the SWRCB never defines the term "socio-economic impacts," the term has been defined
in other settings. The focus of a socio-economic impact analysis is to calculate how an event will change the
lives of current and future residents of a community. Evaluating socio-economic impacts involves looking at
such factors as demographics, housing, employment and income, public services, retail business analysis,
quality of life, and aesthetics. Mary M. Edwards, Community Guide to Development Impact Analysis(2000), at
http://www.lic.wisc.edu/shapingdane/facilitation/all-resources/impacts/define-socio.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
152. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77 n.19.
153. Id. The SWRCB engages in this discussion because the SDCWA challenged the SWRCB's
authority to consider the socio-economic effects of the transfer. It is noteworthy that the SWRCB buries this
discussion in footnote nineteen rather than discussing it in the text of the Order. Id.
154. CAL. WATER CODE § 1727(b) (West 1999). Subdivision (b) states that the SWRCB "shall approve"
a short-term transfer if the specified conditions are met. Id.
155. Id. § 1736 (stating that the SWRCB "may approve" a long-term transfer if the specified conditions
are met).
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construction [of sections 1727 and 1736] that precludes the SWRCB from
considering the public interest ... if the change had been proposed as part of the
original application.', 56 The SWRCB furthered its argument by referring to
California's "official policy ... to facilitate voluntary water transfers 'where
consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and the place of
import.'",
Although the SWRCB chose to rely on sections 1727 and 1736, these
provisions were not the SWRCB's only options for statutory support.'58
California Water Code section 386 states that the SWRCB can only "approve any
change associated with a transfer" if the SWRCB finds that the change may be
made without "unreasonably affect[ing] the overall economy of the area from
which the water is being transferred."'' 9 When sections 1727 and 1736 are viewed
in light of the apparent legislative intent and examined alongside section 386, one
might argue that the SWRCB has the statutory authority to consider the socio-
economic impacts of proposed long-term transfers of surface water.'60 Such an
argument would mistakenly assume that section 386 applies to the proposed
IID/SDCWA transfer. 6 ' Section 386 is inapplicable to the proposed transfer
because the provision is explicitly applicable only to local or regional public
agencies"' when addressing transfers under California Water Code Chapter 3.6(commencing with section 380) of Division 1.163 Thus, the statutory language
156. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77 n.19.
157. Id. (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a) (West 1982) and CAL. WATER CODE § 174).
158. See Translating Concept into Reality, supra note 127 (discussing other provisions that permit the
SWRCB to examine the economic effects of transfers).
159. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 2003); see also Translating Concept into Reality, supra note
127 (stating that section 386 allows review of the economic impacts of transfers). Although the State Water
Project Analysis Office (SWPAO) states that section 386 gives the SWRCB power to examine the socio-
economic impacts of transfers, it is noteworthy that the SWRCB has not relied on this statute. Additionally,
there is no California case law interpreting the statute. If section 386 truly were directly on point as SWPAO
seems to indicate, one would think that the SWRCB would have relied on section 386 rather than inferring that,
when read together, sections 1727 and 1736 authorize review of the socio-economic impacts because of the
Legislature's use of permissive and mandatory language. See SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12,
at 77 n.19 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1727, 1736 (West Supp. 2003)).
160. See Translating Concept into Reality, supra note 127 (discussing Water Code section 386); see also
SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 77 (discussing sections 1727 and 1736).
161. See SDCWA's Closing Brief, supra note 45, at 89 (stating that section 386 is inapplicable to the
proposed transfer).
162. CAL. WATER CODE § 380(d) (West Supp. 2003) (limiting the applicability of California Water
Code Chapter 3.6 (commencing with section 380) of Division 1 to local and regional agencies as defined by
Government Code section 65930). California Government Code section 65930 defines a local agency as "any
public agency other than a state agency." CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65930 (West 1997). As a state agency, the
SWRCB is not a local agency and cannot engage in a review of the economic impacts of the place of origin
under California Water Code section 386. Rather than empower the SWRCB, section 386 effectively decreases
the SWRCB's power vis 6 vis the local agencies because section 386 grants to local agencies a power not
statutorily granted to the SWRCB. See supra Part IV.A (concluding that no statute empowers the SWRCB to
review the socio-economic impacts of water transfers).
163. See CAL. WATER CODE § 382(b) (West Supp. 2003) (stating that Chapter 3.6 (commencing with
section 380) of Division I "does not prohibit or restrict the transfer of water ... by local or regional public
agencies pursuant to other provisions of law").
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precludes the proposed IID/SDCWA transfer being subject to California Water
Code section 386 since the proposed transfer is governed by California Water
Code sections 1735 through 1737'6' and the SWRCB is a state agency.1
6
1
Other than California Water Code section 386, the only California Water
Code provision that mentions socio-economic review is section 1810.'16
Even if one assumes that the SWRCB has the authority to evaluate the socio-
economic impacts of a water transfer, the statutes under which the SWRCB
purportedly has the authority to engage in such an evaluation do not provide
guidance as to how the evaluation should be undertaken.1 7 California Water
Code section 386 provides the most guidance when it states that the transfer must
not "unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from which the water is
being transferred."'68 However, it is unclear what "unreasonably affect" means.
SB 479 provides only slightly less guidance than does Water Code section
386. SB 479 states that the SWRCB "may approve a petition for a long-term
transfer if the change ... would not cause substantial negative third-party
impacts... ,,169 Thus, while section 386 states that the SWRCB should look at
economic impacts, SB 479 uses the broader term "third-party impacts.' 70 Section
386 and SB 479 fail to provide guidance as to which factors the SWRCB should
consider and how much weight should be given to each factor.17' Even if the
SWRCB's most dramatic estimates for the potential socio-economic impacts
were accurate, are these impacts unreasonable?
164. SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-0013, supra note 12, at 20.
165. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 174-188 (West 1971 & Supp. 2003).
166. California Water Code section 1810 states,
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the state, nor any regional or local public
agency may deny a bona fide transferor of water the use of a water conveyance facility which
has unused capacity, for the period of time for which that capacity is available, if fair
compensation is paid for that use, subject to the following: ... (d) This use of a water
conveyance facility is to be made without injuring any legal user of water and without
unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses and without
unreasonably affecting the overall economy or the environment of the county from which the
water is being transferred.
Id. § 1810 (West Supp. 2003).
167. Id. §§ 386, 1727, 1736 (West Supp. 2003).
168. Id. § 386.
169. SB 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but not enacted).
170. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 2003); SB 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but
not enacted).
171. Neither Water Code section 386 nor SB 479 clarifies what the SWRCB should do if an entire
industry is destroyed, but new industries are created. Is destroying the farming industry with its important
cultural roots an unreasonable impact on the economy if other industries in the local area will benefit from the
transfer? Furthermore, how much injury is unreasonable? See CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 2003)
(offering no guidance or guidelines for such an analysis). SB 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but
not enacted) (same).
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V. SHOULD THE SWRCB HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER
SoCIo-ECONOMIc EFFECTS OF WATER TRANSFERS?
The SWRCB is a regulatory agency: its function is to regulate the water
supply in California."' When the SWRCB is carrying out its regulatory function,
it is regulating an economic activity: the sale of water from one party to
another.'73 A theoretical justification for regulating such economic activities is to
force individuals to internalize externalities. 74 An externality occurs when one
person's actions affect other individuals or groups. 75 An externality can be either
harmful (such as air pollution) or beneficial (such as a neighbor painting his
house and thereby increasing the property value of the other homes in the
neighborhood).176 The externality is internalized when one must account for the
effects of one's actions on others.1 77 A market fails when it does not force
individuals to consider all the effects of their actions. 78 Although some
commentators would argue that government intervention is required to force
individuals to internalize externalities and correct the market failure, most
economists do not agree with this analysis. 179 Many economists argue that
externalities could be internalized through the market if property rights were
defined with sufficient clarity and could be freely exchanged.80
An example is useful when attempting to understand externalities and ways
to internalize them:
[C]onsider the issues raised by... a building plot. Its borderlines can be
determined with great precision at relatively low cost. The space above
(and below) the surface of the plot also belongs to the landowner, but
here a more serious specification problem arises. Clearly, the air in the
space above the plot cannot be assigned, molecule by molecule, to the
172. See supra Part 1lI.B (discussing the role of the SWRCB).
173. See Grant, supra note 5 at 702 (discussing the function of public interest review).
174. Id.
175. LEE, supra note 73, at 8.
176. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 90 (2000).
177. Id.
178. LEE, supra note 73, at 8. (discussing externalities and distinguishing between different types of
externalities). Lee argues that there are two types of externalities: technological and pecuniary. Id. at 9.
Pecuniary externalities are those which do not affect the productive capacity of society, but only affect third
parties through changes in price. Id. Technological externalities, however, affect the productive capacity of
society. Id. Lee argues that only technological externalities should be considered when measuring the efficiency
of a water transfer. Id. at 9-10.
179. See STEVEN E. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, &
PUBLIC POLICY 66-81 (1985) (discussing externalities resulting from market failure and noting that while this is
a common argument to support market regulation, most economists do not support regulation to combat
externalities because governments are not more effective than markets).
180. See id. (discussing economists' views on the market, government regulation, externalities and
economic efficiency).
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exclusive use of the landowner. What the state can do instead, for
example, is to give the owner the right to apply for an injunction to rule
out the creation of smoke, noise, smells, or other external effects in his
immediate neighborhood... The state may assign rights in the opposite
fashion and give the neighbors the right to pollute the air or be noisy.
Nevertheless, whatever the assignment of rights turns out to be, if zero
transaction costs are assumed, individuals will (ideally) trade some of
their rights away until ... the marginal benefit of the transfer is just
equal to the marginal disbenefit....
Despite the differences in opinion about the proper way to deal with
externalities (market or regulation), economists and non-economists alike agree
that water is not like most goods.'82 Many economists agree that the argument for
government intervention is strongest in the case of public goods. "3 A public, or
collective consumption, good can be described as a good "where consumption is
nonrival (i.e., a number of people may simultaneously consume the same good)
and where it is either prohibitively expensive or impossible to confine the
benefits of the good to selected individuals."' 8 4 Although water shares some
characteristics with public goods since no one can fully own water and the
community has always been viewed to have an interest in it, "5 water does not fit
the definition of a public good because consumption of water is rival.'86 Even if
water does not fit the classic definition of a public good, water could still be
categorized as a "social good."'87 Social goods are goods without which there
could be no civilization.'8 Scholars have long argued that water must be subject
to public regulation because of water's essential role for "human well-being and
its vulnerability to 'doctoring, diverting, or intercepting the supply. ,,,,"9 Thus,
the combination of these vulnerabilities and water's nature as a necessary
commodity to sustain life and civilization distinguishes water from all other
181. FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 176, at 90-91 (footnote omitted) (noting that in economics, this
is called the "Coase Theorum").
182. See Helen M. Ingram et al., Replacing Confusion with Equity: Alternatives for Water Policy in the
Colorado River Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 179-181 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee
Brown eds., 1986) (noting that water has been treated as different from other goods since the beginning of
civilization).
183. RHOADS, supra note 179, at 66; FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 176, at 96 (stating that with
public goods, "[It]here is a presumption that the state might usefully intervene..
184. RHOADS, supra note 179, at 66.
185. Joseph L. Sax, A Legal View: Community Rights and the Privitixition of Water, in SHARING
SCARCITY: GAINERS & LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 11, 12 (Harold 0. Carter, et al. eds., 1994).
186. If consumption of water were nonrival, then there would be no dispute about water transfers since
everyone could consume as much as they desire without affecting how much other people can consume. See
RHOADS, supra note 178, at 66 (defining "public good").
187. Ingram et al., supra note 182, at 179.
188. See id. at 179-81 (discussing water as a social good).
189. Id. at 179 (quoting PLATO, THE LAWS, 844a-845e and also citing to ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1330a-b).
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resources and necessitates the regulation of water as a social good."' Once water
is viewed as a public good or social good, it becomes more palatable that it is
subject to government regulation."' After it has been determined that government
regulation of water is beneficial to society, the next logical step in the analysis is
to examine to what extent the regulations should constrain water transfers. '92
Public interest review of water transfers has gained increased acceptance by
courts and state legislatures in recent years. ' 3 As of 1971, "Nevada was the only
state with a ... statute requiring denial of proposed transfers that would be
detrimental to the public interest."' Since that time, eight states have enacted
similar statutes.'95 Additionally, at least two state courts and one administrative
agency have undertaken to examine the public interest despite the absence of
express statutory language.' 6 Although an increasing number of jurisdictions
have examined the public interest in deciding whether a water transfer will be
permitted, this examination, "for many years meant little, if anything, beyond
assessing whether a proposed appropriation would conform with the goal of
maximum economic development.""197 In light of the SWRCB's recent review of
the socio-economic impacts of the IID/SDCWA transfer and the increasing
number of jurisdictions with state agencies reviewing the socio-economic effects
of transfers, the question that must be asked is whether the SWRCB should look
at factors other than maximum economic development when it is attempting to
force parties to internalize the externalities associated with water transfers. '9
190. Ingram et al., supra note 182, at 179-81. At times, it can be difficult to distinguish a community's
interest in preventing water from leaving the community from a community's interest in preventing other
resources from leaving the community. A useful comparison can be made between water transfers and large
manufacturing firms leaving a community. Like water, a manufacturing firm can be inextricably intertwined in
the social fabric of a community. See Andrew E. G. Jonas, Corporate Takeovers and the Politics of Community,
68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 348, 364 (Oct. 1992) (noting the influence that large manufacturing firms can have on
the social fabric of a community). Like water, large firms affect the entire community when they leave. Due to
the profound effect that corporate flight can have on a community, governments have sought to restrict similar
corporate moves. See Jonas, supra, at 364-65 (discussing efforts in Massachusetts to pass an anti-takeover law
that staggers terms for members of boards of directors). Unlike with water transfers, however, governments
have sought to control corporate moves by methods other than conditioning corporate moves on their socio-
economic impacts. See id. (same).
191. See RHOADS, supra note 179, at 66 (stating that "[t]he case for government intervention is strongest
for public goods").
192. Although the remainder of this comment focuses on whether socio-economic impacts should be
reviewed, it is important to acknowledge that there are other aspects of water regulation that are beyond the
scope of this comment.
193. Grant, supra note 5, at 684.
194. Id. (referring to 1913 Nev. Stat. 211, which was enacted in 1913).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 684-85. Although "the Alaska legislature rejected a proposal for public interest review of
transfers ... the state water agency... decided that a public interest review requirement is implicit in the state
water code." Id. (footnote omitted).
197. Id. at 688.
198. See generally Grant, supra note 5 (discussing the increasing prevalence of public interest review of
water transfers).
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A. Economic Considerations
Economic values are "aggregated monetary weights of individual preferences
expressed through marketplace transactions."'99 Although economic values are
concrete and quantifiable, they are extremely difficult to calculate."'
The traditional goals of water resource policies have been to provide the
community with supplies of water sufficient to meet the community's needs,
control flooding, and maintain navigable waterways.20 ' Water policy planners
attempted to achieve these goals while minimizing costs and encouraging growth
in a particular area.0 2 These policy planners did not consider other criteria when
deciding whether a water project should be undertaken. 3
B. Social Considerations
While economic considerations are concrete and quantifiable, social
considerations are abstract and qualitative. Social considerations can be separated
into three categories: "social values," "societal goals," and "program objectives.,
20 4
Social values include the widely shared concepts of what is "good and desirable"
and characterize a culture. Social values are often manifested in religion, politics
and familial relations. While social values are difficult to express, "[s]ocietal
goals are more clearly expressed statements of what a society is trying to
accomplish through collective action.20 7
Sociological values provide a ... normative criterion for water resources
planning. A community's ... social values represent its desire to achieve a
social benefit, or avoid a social cost. They represent a community's
aspirations and identity, and are established through a process of public
debate and deliberation .... Sociological values ... are context-specific
and represent the collective moral considerations as to how a community
thinks it should act, independent of how each individual would act in a
199. James P. Morris, Who Controls the Water? Incorporating Environmental and Social Values in
Water Resources Planning, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 117, 119 (2000).
200. Gould, supra note 2, at 464-65 (discussing the difficulties associated with calculating the third-
party effects of water transfers).
201. Morris, supra note 199, at 118.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 122.
204. William B. Lord, An Evolutionary Perspective on Social Values in SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
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private transaction. In this respect,.., social values create a set of guiding
ethical principles for water resources planning .... 0'
Public opinion and distributive impacts are at the heart of the issue when
social values are considered during meetings to determine whether a water
project, such as a transfer, should be undertaken.2"9
Analysts have attempted to quantify social values since these values were
first factored into the equation of whether a water project should be undertaken.2 °
Unfortunately, the elusiveness of quantifying these values makes it difficult for
water policy planners to overcome obstacles to action."' Although numerous
theories attempt to quantify social costs,2 2 water planners might have to accept
the political reality that some values are intangible and not quantifiable.23
C. Institutional Competence
Once the decision has been made that the government should analyze the
socio-economic effects of a water transfer before a transfer is approved, the next
logical question is which branch and what level of government should be charged
with the duty of engaging in such an analysis and providing guidelines: should
the executive, legislative or judicial branch set the standards and engage in the
review? Should the federal, state or local government be charged with the
responsibility to determine whether a water transfer should take place?
The judicial branch was traditionally charged with the duty of formulating
property law.214 During the nineteenth century, property law was a creature of
common law and judges attempted to change the law to keep it in-step with
208. Morris, supra note 199, at 119.
209. See id. at 123 (discussing how consideration of social values has impacted water resources
planning).
210. See id. at 142-43 (explaining that planners attempted to quantify social objectives by focusing on
the tangible economic costs that would result from jobs lost, created, or retained). Planners further attempted to
quantify less tangible effects (such as value derived from the recreational value of leaving water for in-stream
recreational uses) by examining how willing people were to pay to gain particular benefits or avoid particular
costs. Id. This willingness-to-pay analysis converts social objectives into people's economic preferences,
thereby yielding a quantifiable result. Id.
211. See Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., Comments from a Political Science Perspectivg in SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 140 (Warren Viessman,
Jr. & Kyle E. Schilling eds., 1986) (discussing how implementing environmental objectives requires
"overcoming impediments to action").
212. See Benjamin F. Hobbs & Walter M. Grayman, Dealing with Social and Enironmental Evaluative
Criteria, in SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
311-14 (Warren Viessman, Jr. & Kyle E. Schilling eds., 1986) (discussing different approaches to valuing social
considerations).
213. Caulfield, supra note 211, at 137.
214. Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 43 (1996); see 62 CAL.
JUR. 3d Water § 25 (1981) (stating that prior to 1914, California had limited statutory law pertaining to water
rights); cf HUTCHINS, supra note 61, at 89 (noting that California enacted Civil Code sections 1410 to 1422 in
1872 which set forth the procedures for appropriating water).
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societal values."' Since the twentieth century, however, the common law has
been eclipsed by legislative statutes and regulatory mandates.216 This shift in
responsibility was precipitated by experience's revelation that courts have
difficulty drawing sharp legal lines and are unable to phase in laws allowing
parties time to conform their actions with new laws."' Courts wield their power
bluntly: courts merely declare that water rights have come to an end and are
unable to collectively work with water users to help the user adjust the harmful
behavior."'
Unlike courts, legislatures and regulatory agencies can hold detailed hearings
and listen to multiple views from numerous experts before enacting a statute or
regulation.' Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
agencies are well equipped to make policy choices and resolve competing
interests in light of everyday realities.220
Unfortunately, legislatures and regulatory agencies are similar to courts in
that they too are not without their flaws. 2' One such problem, specifically in
regard to regulatory agencies, is a lack of direct accountability to the people.222
Along with a lack of accountability comes the question of whose interests are
represented. 23 Although the SWRCB is a diverse agency representing divergent
interests, this is not true of all regulatory agencies.224
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is still unclear whether the SWRCB has the power to consider the
socio-economic effects of long-term transfers, 25 it is clear that substantial socio-
economic effects may result from water transfers226 and, absent regulation, these





220. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting that, "[w]hile agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices..
221. Freyfogle, supra note 214, at 43.
222. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
223. See Freyfogle, supra note 214, at 43 (citing Daniel A. Farbes, From Plastic Trees to Arrons
Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 352-54 (1986)) (claiming that, "[t]oo often and too visibly [agencies] are
bent by vested interests").
224. The SWRCB is composed of five members who are appointed by the governor, and each of whom
"succeeds to and is vested with all the powers, duties, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction vested in the
Department and Director of Public Works, the Division of Water Resources .... [and] the [SWRCB]..."
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 175, 179 (West 1971).
225. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the SWRCB's authority).
226. See generally KAHRL, supra note 23 (discussing in depth the devastating third-party impacts of the
Owens Valley/Los Angeles transfer); but see SDCWA's Closing Brief, supra note 45, at 94-97 (discussing the
short-term Metropolitan Water District/Palo Verde Irrigation District transfer).
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impacts would not be calculated into the market price.2 When one considers the
important role that water plays in our society and the gravity of the potential
impacts from water transfers, it is easy see why scholars have argued for review
of socio-economic impacts. If one accepts that socio-economic impacts should be
considered, then other questions must be addressed. One must first determine
which factors should be weighed and how much weight should be given to these
factors. Additionally, one must determine what level of government should
examine and weigh these factors.228 Should the local agency review the transfer as
in California Water Code section 386 or should the SWRCB review the transfer
as in SB 479? These are policy questions that must be answered by the
Legislature.
227. See supra Part V (discussing the relevant economic and social considerations and the role of
regulatory agencies in the process).
228. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 2003); SB 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but
not enacted).
